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The Just World Fallacy as a Challenge to the Business-As-Community Thesis 
M. Sinnicks, Northumbria University 
Abstract 
The notion that business organisations are akin to Aristotelian political communities has been 
a central feature of research into virtue ethics in business. In this article I begin by outlining 
this ‘community thesis’ and go on to argue that psychological research into the ‘just world 
fallacy’ presents it with a significant challenge. The just world fallacy undermines our ability 
to implement an Aristotelian conception of justice, to each as he or she is due, and imperils the 
relational equality required for shared participation in communities. In the final section, I offer 
a description of what Aristotelian community might look like within organisations, and some 
suggestions about how it may be possible to resist the challenge posed by the just world fallacy. 
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Since its renaissance in the second half of the twentieth century, virtue ethics, and in particular 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, has been taken up with some enthusiasm by business ethicists 
(Cowton, 2008), and is now perhaps as common a focus in the business ethics literature as any 
other ethical theory. One feature of this voluminous scholarship is the notion that modern 
business organisations are analogous to the Polis, the ancient Greek city-state, and can be 
regarded as Aristotelian communities.  I refer to this as the ‘community thesis’. Community 
too has become an important topic in recent scholarship, across a variety of disciplines. A 
number of scholars have argued that ‘community’ has been eroded in contemporary society 
with increasing levels of social fragmentation, individualism, normlessness, uncertainty and 
anxiety (see, for instance, Bellah et al, 2007; Putnam, 1998; Sennett, 1998, 2006). The notion 
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that community can occur, and indeed be fostered, in business organisations is therefore worthy 
of further investigation, and in this article, I outline a challenge to those who accept the 
community thesis. 
Another central facet of contemporary virtue ethics is the interest its proponents, in the 
spirit of Aristotle himself, have shown in empirical work relevant to ethics and moral 
philosophy (see Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller 2017 for a good selection). However, one 
notable strand of such research in psychology which has received little attention from 
Aristotelians, or indeed ethicists of any stripe, is the ‘just world fallacy’, which can be defined 
as the phenomenon of people mistakenly believing fortuitous patterns of reward or harm to be 
in some way just. The main aim of this article is to outline the consequences this fallacy has 
for the community thesis. 
I begin by outlining Aristotelian business ethics and the view that we can understand 
business organisations as forms of Aristotelian political community advanced by Solomon 
(1992, 1993), Sison and Fontrodona (2012, 2013), Hartman (2015), and many others. I then 
move on to outline the just world fallacy, and the challenge this fallacy presents to the notion 
that business organisations can be understood as Aristotelian communities. This challenge 
results from the fact that the just world fallacy undermines our ability to implement an 
Aristotelian conception of justice, to each as he or she is due, and imperils the kinds of 
relationships required for shared participation in communities, relationships which must be 
between parties who are, in some sense, equals, and so not undermined by an undue deference 
or an undue disregard.  
This does not render the notion of business organisations as communities unattractive 
as a normative ideal, instead it shows just how difficult an ideal it is to realise. Nevertheless, 
in the final section, I offer a description of what Aristotelian community might look like within 
organisations, and some suggestions about how it may be possible to resist the challenge posed 
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by the just world fallacy. I do so by highlighting four features I take to be conducive to the 
existence of genuine community: a suspicion of inequality, few displays of unequal power, an 
emphasis on face-to-face interaction, and relatively equal pay. While I remain sceptical about 
the viability of the community thesis in light of the challenge posed by the just world fallacy, 
these suggestions seem to me to give organisations the best chance of establishing a genuine 
sense of community, and avoiding the ethically deleterious effects of individuals tending to 
mistakenly believe that fortuitous patterns of reward are based on merit. 
 
Aristotelian Business Ethics and the ‘Community Thesis’ 
According to the Aristotelian tradition, understood in broad terms to include Neo-Aristotelians, 
Thomists, as well as some Marxists1, ethics is fundamentally concerned with the pursuit of 
flourishing. Virtues – settled states of character that dispose us to act well – are at once 
conducive to, and partially constitutive of, that flourishing. Unlike deontological and 
consequentialist accounts of ethics, Aristotelian virtue ethics does not primarily aim to identify 
rules and principles to govern conduct, but focuses rather on broader questions about how we 
are to live. According to Aristotle, ethics cannot be fully captured by any system of rules (NE 
1094b). This is not to say that ethics is incompatible with the existence of moral rules, which 
Aristotle recognised as being important, but rather that rules are never sufficient for morality. 
Virtuous action always requires sound judgement on the part of the virtuous agent. 
The virtues themselves are always a mean between extremes of excess and deficiency, 
and are acquired partly through a process of active habituation. For example, temperance is a 
mean between self-indulgence and an insensibility to pleasure, and we become temperate by 
acting temperately. On the path to virtue we may need to steel ourselves against temptations, 
and perform virtuous actions unhappily, but when virtue is fully acquired, the acts that follow 
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from it are done willingly, and chosen for their own sake (NE 1105a). The highest human end, 
according to Aristotle, is rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (NE 1097b). 
The process of virtue acquisition, and indeed the pursuit of flourishing, is not a matter 
for isolated individuals. Aristotle held that politics is a continuation, and in some ways the 
culmination, of ethics. He argues that the state is prior to the individual, and is the whole of 
which the individual is a part (Pol 1253a). As individuals, we can only achieve our ultimate 
goal of flourishing within the Polis, a kind of association we are fitted to by nature. As Aristotle 
says ‘‘among all men there is a natural impulse towards this kind of association’’ (Pol 1252b). 
Human beings are, by nature, political animals, and our good can only be sought within a 
political community. A community in this Aristotelian sense is not simply a haphazard 
assemblage of individuals, but rather “a unified body of individuals; people with common 
interests… with common characteristics or beliefs… a group organized around common 
values” (Melé, 2012, p.92). It is this sense of shared values that allows Aristotle to claim that 
the good of a Polis is the flourishing of its citizens. Citizens were not passive recipients of the 
benefits the state provided – they had to contribute to the state and were directly involved in 
governing. For Aristotle, foreigners, slaves, children, and women, were not true citizens of the 
Polis, only those entitled to participate in the state’s deliberative and legislative processes were 
(Pol 1275b). Participation in the life of the community was required for full membership of the 
state.  
Aristotle was not an egalitarian in a distributional sense. He held that a desire for this 
kind of equality was a cause of disharmony that was common to city-states of his time (Pol 
1301b) and thought it proper for honours to be unequally awarded in line with the uneven 
distribution of virtue amongst people. However, he did worry that victorious parties in such 
conflicts wielded power without regard to equality (Pol 1296b), and he did hold that the 
freemen of the city state, those eligible for citizenship, were each other’s equals in an important 
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sense, even if they possessed differing degrees of wealth and influence, and he did hold that 
the best kind of friendship could only exist between equals (see Kraut 2006). Politics deals 
with the conditions in which the virtuous deliberate together about how to pursue their 
flourishing, secure in the knowledge that no-one’s flourishing can be pursued outside the Polis. 
For Aristotle then, a kind of relational, rather than distributional, equality is important for 
friendship and for political communities, despite his suspicion that people capable of 
adequately partaking in these facets of the best life were rare. Aristotle thought society should 
be class-based and hierarchical because he assumed only a small elite were capable of being 
true citizens, but true citizens shared the same fundamental status as such, and so could relate 
to each other as equal participants in the life of the community.  
The concept of ‘relational equality’ is typically associated with liberalism, broadly, and 
democratic egalitarianism, in particular (see Anderson 1999), rather than Aristotelianism. 
However, this is largely because Aristotelian political thought, more commonly associated with 
communitarianism, makes greater, and morally richer, demands of the participants in a political 
community, i.e. that they are engaged in meaningfully co-operating, collaborating, and directly 
participating in community affairs, not because this minimal conception of relational equality 
is unimportant. While differences in status may remain, there is an important sense in which 
community members relate to each other in a way that is unstructured by such differences. In 
this sense, relational equality is associated with the ideal of equal citizenship in terms of rights 
and duties, which is an ideal that unites liberals and communitarian critics of liberalism (see, 
for example, Taylor, 1994; Walzer, 1983). Indeed, if sharing the same fundamental status and 
relating to fellow citizens as equals is an ideal appropriate to liberal democracy, it is at least 
required by the more ethically rich conception of citizenship in the Polis. Insofar as 
contemporary Aristotelianism seeks to reject Aristotle’s own social prejudices while retaining 
his insights, it is able to recognise that the ability to participate meaningfully in a community 
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is less rare than Aristotle supposed. Just as the Aristotelian goes beyond the basic relational 
equality of liberalism in terms of what it asks of members of the community, one theme of this 
article, which we will come to below, is that we need to go further still in challenging 
Aristotle’s own acceptance of inequality. 
Even if we can simply ignore some of the more unpalatable features of Aristotle’s 
thought, there are others that pose problems for contemporary Aristotelians. One example of 
such a problem is the fact that it is not easy to accommodate an understanding of business as 
an ethical endeavour within Aristotle’s political theory. Aristotle himself was hostile to 
commercial pursuits, which he regarded as being incompatible with flourishing. This position 
seems to be much more deeply entrenched in ‘Aristotelianism’ than Aristotle’s own low 
opinion of women and foreigners, or his acceptance of slavery. Indeed, he regarded profit-
seeking activity as a kind of perversion. Each craft has its own distinctive purpose, and so to 
engage in any craft with the accrual of wealth as the main motivation is to fail to give due 
attention to that purpose. So, although he recognised trade as being necessary, if perhaps the 
sort of thing a noble person would have as little to do with as possible, Aristotle was entirely 
opposed to activities which focused on profit-making as an end in itself. As such, he would 
have had a low opinion of the majority of business organisations in capitalist society. Indeed, 
far from being virtuous, business activity would, on Aristotle’s view, be primarily characterised 
by the vice of pleonexia. ‘Pleonexia’, sometimes translated as ‘avarice’, denotes both an 
“excessive desire to get more” and “violates canons of distributive fairness” within 
communities (Balot, 2001, p.33).  
Nevertheless, a number of business ethicists have been inspired by Aristotle, and the 
Aristotelian tradition more generally, and have taken up his focus on the political community, 
suggested that business organisations can be understood as examples of such communities, and 
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highlight the ethically salient features of community membership within the business 
organisation.  
According to Solomon, “[c]orporations are real communities, neither ideal nor 
idealized, and therefore the perfect place to start understanding the nature of the virtues” 
(Solomon, 1992, p.325). In these communities, relationships are more than mere contractual 
associations, and “consist, first of all, in a shared sense of belonging, a shared sense of mission 
or, at least, a shared sense of mutual interest” (Solomon, 1994, p.277). Furthermore, “If the 
corporation is to be a good community, it must be an all-embracing community” (ibid, p.285), 
suggesting that all members of the community are held in esteem. Here we see Solomon’s 
commitment to a version of the relational equality present in Aristotle’s own thinking about 
the Polis. Though it is unstated, one presumes that those who advance the community thesis 
intend ordinary organisational members to be considered citizens, not slaves. 
The Aristotelian thread of Solomon’s account of business ethics runs deep enough for 
him to accept the notion that our good and that of our business community cannot be entirely 
separated. “What is best in us — our virtues — are in turn defined by that larger community, 
and there is therefore no ultimate split or antagonism between individual self-interest and the 
greater public good” (Solomon, 2004, pp.1022-1023), a sentiment which applies both to the 
relationship between individual and business and to the relationship between business and 
wider society itself. Solomon highlights the centrality of relationships within the community: 
“What is worth defending in business is the sense of virtue that stresses cooperative joint effort 
and concern for consumers and colleagues alike” (Solomon, 2004, p.1025). As Solomon says: 
“It takes no leap of faith to move from the actual cultures of most corporations to the 
recognition that these are cooperative communities… and that mutual respect, caring and 
compassion is what we all in fact expect and demand in our various jobs and positions” (1998, 
p.531). In addition to the emphasis on mutual respect, this sense of compassion, ‘feeling with’, 
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highlights the way in which Aristotelian communities go beyond the basic relationships 
required for membership of liberal democratic societies. Each member’s participation is 
important, on Solomon’s view: “what drives a corporation… is the collective will… of its 
employees” (1993, p.150). 
Some business ethicists in the Aristotelian tradition have even conceived of the business 
community not simply as providing a site of cooperation, but as being conducive to the 
achievement of our deepest virtuous aspirations. Dobson claims that “the modern firm is an 
institutional form capable of supporting a valid utopian ideal” (2008, p.67). Sison and 
Fontrodona claim that “the common good of the firm is the collaborative work that allows 
human beings not only to produce goods and services… but more importantly, to develop 
technical or artistic skills and intellectual and moral virtues” and that each “worker is an actual 
part of the common good of the firm because everyone makes a meaningful difference to the 
whole” (2013, p.614). Sison and Fontrodona also note that they accept Aristotle’s perspective 
on “sharing a good life in common, with family, friends and fellow-citizens in the polis… The 
common good results from the joint deliberation, decision and action of citizens.” (2012, 
p.214). At the very least, this suggests that everyone is worthy of a hearing and everyone 
deserves to be part of the process of deliberation. Indeed, according to Sison and Fontrodona, 
corporate governance needs to be “decided on by a firm’s members through joint deliberation 
or dialogue” (2012, p.233). Here, again, we can see the importance of avoiding undue deference 
or disregard, which may hinder this deliberation and dialogue. 
On this understanding of business organisations, the element of shared endeavour, and 
perhaps even moral growth, is as central to business as the focus on profit. If profit-seeking is 
regarded as but one feature of many, then even if Aristotle’s harsh pronouncements on the 
ethics of profit-seeking are correct, they will not necessarily be decisive in a discussion of 
business ethics. Indeed, business ethics can be recast as a branch of political philosophy, and 
9 
 
the profit motive a necessary constraint and limitation to organisations’ ability to facilitate the 
good life for their citizens. 
This conception of business ethics in terms of Aristotle’s account of political 
communities has noteworthy implications. For instance, it opposes accounts which focus 
mainly on compliance with ethical rules, or on maximising shareholder value, promoting good 
consequences (perhaps in terms of Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives), and so on. 
While advocates of the community thesis may be happy to accept all of these as being worthy 
aims, they will be additionally concerned with the relationships between members of the 
community, and concerned to ensure that all members are able to be fully functioning 
participants in that community. Melé highlights the importance of decision-making in this 
participation: “a person within a community participates together with others in the realization 
of the common activity. But participation also means taking part in the community or in the 
decision making on matters which affect one’s own life” (2012, p.98). Melé also claims that 
“Community is made up of relations or feelings with a sense of ‘fellowship’” (2012, p.92), and 
that “when we affirm that a firm is a community of persons, we emphasize both individuals 
and the whole, making explicit the… openness to self-realization of each one who forms the 
community” (2012, p.97). In this sense, each member is on equal standing with others with 
respect to their desert of self-realisation.  
According to Bragues “[t]he corporations that now fill our economic landscape provide 
a much bigger array of leadership opportunities than was the case in Aristotle’s time, in which 
a high place in government offered the only opportunity to oversee large associations” (2006, 
p.354). This suggests Aristotle’s political philosophy applies especially to business ethics, and 
echoes Solomon’s suggestion that business organisations are the ‘perfect place’ to begin an 
enquiry into virtue. However, even if we agree that business organisations present such an 
opportunity, it does not mean that businesses are always communities just as city states might 
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fall short, on Aristotle’s view, if they are somehow deformed and do not contribute to the 
human good, do not permit the requisite form of participation, and so on. The enthusiasm of 
defenders of the community thesis notwithstanding, we may wish to offer more modest claims 
about the possibility of community in business organisations. Indeed, others have been careful 
to offer more restricted, normative claims. 
O’Toole claims that in the Aristotelian workplace “all employees participate in the 
decisions that affect their work” (2008, p.198), though he is not optimistic that such workplaces 
can ever be widespread. Hartman has written much of interest on Aristotelianism in business 
ethics (see, for instance, 1998, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). On the topic of business organisations as 
communities he says: 
 
Aristotle would approve of our focus on the organization... Today, when organizations seem to 
be overtaking nation states as the primary form of association and identification, and corporate 
culture is such a powerful determinant of behavior, he might well say that the culmination of 
ethics is organization theory. He might well say, too, that good corporations mold good people. 
(2008, p.261) 
 
While Hartman is clear that he wants to “suggest what virtue in business looks like, and argue 
that it is possible, not that it is probable” (2015, p.20), the notion that Aristotle would approve 
of a focus on the organisation is presumably because the prospects of business organisations 
functioning as genuine communities is real. For the culmination of ethics to be organisation 
theory, then organisations must provide us with what we need to live flourishing lives, namely 
a community within which to pursue this flourishing. At the very least we seem to be talking 
about a real possibility, rather than an abstract possibility, or something merely conceivable. 
The claim that business organisations are communities is not limited to Aristotelians. 
As Néron (2010) points out, many business ethicists of all stripes have sought to understand 
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businesses as political communities, for instance work in the Kantian tradition (Bowie 2017), 
and CSR scholarship (Freeman & Liedtka, 1991; Hecksher & Adler, 2007). 
It is likely, therefore, that the challenge I will go on to outline in the following section 
applies to a broader array of positions than I focus on here. However, I focus on Aristotelian 
business ethics both for the sake of concision, and because it is the position to which the 
challenge most readily applies, given the prominent place afforded to the community thesis 
within Aristotelian business ethics. Ultimately, I will conclude by offering a heavily qualified 
endorsement of Hartman’s normative version of the community thesis and by suggesting some 
ways in which workplace community may be achieved, but in what follows I aim to show that 
any feasible endorsement of the community thesis must be extremely challenging to 
mainstream Aristotelian accounts of business ethics.  
 
Just World Fallacy 
Over the past few decades, there has been much philosophical interest in empirical psychology, 
in particular in cognitive biases and the results of personality psychology. Here I outline the 
just world fallacy and some of its consequences. This phenomenon is sometimes termed ‘belief 
in a just world’, but I use ‘fallacy’ in order to highlight the ethically salient reasoning error at 
its core. While some ethical studies have used a belief in a just world as a variable, for instance 
Ashkanasy et al (2006), for the most part, ethicists have not attempted to explore the 
ramifications of the just world fallacy, a variety of what Nisbett and Ross (1991) term “the 
fundamental attribution error”. Unlike situationist critiques of virtue ethics, which hold that 
situational factors shape our moral behaviour to such an extent that explanations in terms of 
character and the virtues is unconvincing (see Doris, 2002, and Harman, 2003 for outlines of 
the situation challenge to virtue ethics, and Webber, 2006, and Alzola 2008, 2012 for 
responses), I do not claim that Aristotelian business ethicists commit the just world fallacy. 
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Rather, I claim that the fact that people are prone to make such errors can be problematic for 
those business ethicists because they undermine the psychological plausibility of the 
community thesis. While the evidence used to support situationism, like the Milgram 
experiment, seems to show that people “are capable of beastly behavior in circumstances where 
their practiced virtues are forced to confront an unusual situation in which unpracticed efforts 
are required” (Solomon, 2003, p.53), the evidence supporting the just world fallacy seems to 
suggest that our evaluations of others are liable to be determined by luck or chance, and are 
thus liable to undermine our ability to participate in Aristotelian communities. It goes well 
beyond the scope of this essay to explore all of its ramifications. However, I believe it presents 
an obstacle for the community thesis as I shall now seek to demonstrate.  
The concept of the just world fallacy emerged as a result of research which showed that 
when confronted with (ostensible) examples of injustice, experimental participants tended to 
show disdain for innocent victims and admiration for the undeservedly successful. Indeed, 
research has suggested that when confronted with broader, societal injustice, participants tend 
to adopt belief systems that serve to justify existing economic and political arrangements (Jost 
et al 2004). In other words, whatever the cause of any particular pattern of reward or 
punishment, participants display a tendency to regard the outcome as being reflective of a just 
allocation, even when that is patently not the case.  
In his original 1965 study, Lerner found that experimental subjects who were told that 
a fellow student had won a cash prize in a random draw were inclined to believe that the student 
worked harder than another student who had not won the prize. The outcome, resulting from 
brute luck, led participants to draw the unwarranted conclusion that the fortunate student had 
done something to deserve it. This “reinterpretation of fortuitous rewards”, as Bénabou and 
Tirole (2006, p.705) put it, suggests that those who enjoy rewards of some kind – power, 
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prestige, money, for example – are automatically regarded as being deserving of those goods, 
and thus our ability to put their merits into question is undermined. 
Another study conducted by Lerner and Simmons (1966) revealed darker implications 
of the fallacy. In this study, participants were confronted with an ‘innocent victim’ – a woman 
participating in a paired-associate learning task who was punished for making mistakes by 
being administered seemingly painful electric shocks. When led to believe that the experiment 
would continue in the same fashion, the participants “chose to devalue and reject the victim” 
(1966, p.209), with participants more likely to reject the victim when they perceived the harm 
done to them was more severe. By contrast, when they were told that the victim would be 
compensated for the pain caused by the electric shocks by being paid for each correct answer, 
participants stopped showing this disdain. Nearly all participants who were given the choice 
between the two opted to give compensation rather than administer the electric shock. 
However, the mere act of deciding to award the victim compensation did not prevent 
participants from attributing fault to the victim. It was only when they were certain that the 
victim would be compensated rather than shocked that the negative evaluations of the victim 
ceased. 
Thus, even in cases where the moral arbitrariness of the outcome is, in some sense, 
visible to the participants, the tendency to incorrectly apportion praise and blame remains. With 
otherwise identical cases, the ‘successful’ were regarded by participants as being deserving of 
their success and the ‘unsuccessful’ were regarded as being deserving of their failure. 
Other research in the field has shown participants inclined to blame AIDS victims 
(Anderson, 1992; Comby et al, 1995; Correia et al, 2001), victims of assault (Hammock & 
Richardson, 1993), victims of spousal abuse (Schuller et al, 1994), as well as to praise 
beneficiaries of gambling gains (Schmitt et al, 1991). This phenomenon of victim blaming 
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resulting from the just world fallacy will prove to be challenging for the community thesis, and 
for the kinds of relationships that thesis presupposes.2 
Research into the just world fallacy suggests we are both prone to be blind to true desert, 
and even when we in some sense recognise that an outcome is unjust we are still prone to 
attribute some degree of personal fault to the victim as if the outcome was simply recompense 
for that fault. While its degree varies between individuals (Rubin & Peplau, 1975), and over a 
third of participants in Lerner and Simmons’ (1966) study did not derogate the unlucky victim, 
the propensity to commit the just world fallacy has “been shown to be stable and cross-
culturally generalizable” (Furnham, 2003, p.795). 
Lerner’s (1965, 1980) explanation of this phenomenon, known as the ‘just world 
hypothesis’, holds that people have a deep need to regard the world as being fundamentally 
just, and committing the just world fallacy allows this belief to be retained even in the face of 
apparently decisive counter-examples. As Lerner and Miller put it, “The just world hypothesis 
is easily stated: Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people 
generally get what they deserve” (1978, p.1050). Indeed, according to Lerner and Simmons, 
“most people cannot afford, for the sake of their own sanity, to believe in a world governed by 
a schedule of random reinforcements” (1966, p.203). To say that people commit the just world 
fallacy for the sake of their sanity may be hyperbolic, but it seems that the best explanation of 
the existence of the fallacy is that there is a kind of psychological pressure exerted by 
apparently inexplicable patterns of reward and harm which leads people to mistakenly 
apportion credit and blame to the respective recipients. 
However, even those who are most prone to the just world fallacy are not able to 
interpret all instances of success and failure as being the result of merit or demerit. Lerner and 
Miller (1978) offer Lifton’s description of the reactions of Hiroshima survivors as an example. 
Such survivors exhibited “a vast breakdown of faith in the larger human matrix supporting each 
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individual's life, and therefore a loss of faith or ‘trust in the structure of existence’” (Lifton, 
1963, p.487). In such extreme cases, an explanation in terms of desert is not just implausible, 
but entirely unavailable. Short of such extremity, however, the just world fallacy seems to be 
robust. While the early literature on the just world fallacy claimed that individuals would act 
to prevent injustice when they were able to do so, but would assimilate ostensible injustice as 
being just when they were not, more recent studies have found that those most prone to commit 
the just world fallacy are least likely to take action in cases where they perceive injustice as 
they tend to assume that all will be well in the end (Gaucher et al, 2010; Stroebe, 2013). While 
other recent research has focused on the potential positive elements of the fallacy (Maes et al, 
2012), such as its connection to forgiveness (Strelan, 2007), it is what the just world fallacy 
tells us about our psychological response to unevenly distributed rewards, and in particular the 
problematic nature of apportioning credit and blame to the undeserving, that concerns us here. 
Why does the existence of the just world fallacy challenge the community thesis in 
business ethics? Because it endangers the sense of equal participation that communities require. 
Such participation requires us to be able to deliberate together about the good of that 
community, and a key part of that deliberation pertains to justice within the community. Unless 
we are able to adequately assess whether rewards or punishments are deserved, we will be 
unable to follow the basic principles of justice that a community requires. According to 
research into the just world fallacy, people are liable to believe that others are due precisely 
what they are given, and so what should result from shared deliberation – judgements about 
who deserves what and why – in fact precedes and shapes it. Therefore, the just world fallacy 
seems to be problematic for any attempt to implement an Aristotelian model of justice, which 
holds that each should be rewarded according to merit, within organisations just as within the 
Polis. 
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Aristotle argued that ‘‘Every state is a community of some kind, and every community 
is established with a view to some good; for mankind always acts in order to obtain that which 
they think good’’ (Pol 1252a). However, this pursuit of communal goods seems to be harder to 
achieve for unequal groups than we might have imagined. Indeed, the just world fallacy 
suggests that it is difficult to separate relational equality, the kind of equality of regard, 
discussed in the previous section, needed to sustain Aristotelian communities by facilitating 
membership of the community and allowing for meaningful participation, from distributional 
equality, i.e. equality with respect to the distribution of goods such as pay and prestige. If we 
have an ingrained tendency to regard the successful as possessing merits that warrant that 
success, even when we are partially able to see that such success is a result of luck, then it will 
be hard to maintain the relational equality required to deliberate together properly. By drawing 
this distinction, I do not mean to suggest that theories of relational equality are unconcerned 
with distribution. Distributional equality might be a tool rather than the end of justice, but given 
this feature of human psychology, it seems to be a tool which is inextricably related to its end.  
Furthermore, given that the just world fallacy also applies to self-evaluations, for 
instance Benson and Ritter (1990) observed a positive relationship between just world belief 
and depression in unemployed subjects, then an unbalanced distribution of goods will, in and 
of itself, be liable to undermine the ability of the less successful to challenge the more 
successful, which is a pre-requisite of shared deliberation within a community.  
The self-derogation that seems to result from the just world fallacy makes it impossible 
for the unsuccessful to regard themselves as equals with their more successful counter-parts. 
Wade et al. (2006) found that CEO compensation affects commitment within an organization 
and that excessive CEO compensation increases turnover at lower levels of an organization. 
One possible explanation of this phenomenon, in light of research into the just world fallacy, 
is that those who are the worst off in a highly economically unequal organisation are less able 
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to feel as though they are full members of a community, and so become less able and willing 
to commit meaningfully to that community.  
If the distance between the CEO and other senior officers, and the rank and file becomes 
too great, then the prevalence of the just world fallacy indicates that the CEO and the others 
will be regarded as deserving of their success whether or not this is so, and renders it less likely 
that legitimate criticism of the highly-rewarded will be forthcoming. If possession of these 
goods is regarded as a reflection of their ability to lead the company, and if even merely 
fortunate gains are regarded as being indicative of deserving qualities, then significant 
inequalities are liable to give rise to an undue deference to the successful. Of course, the just 
world fallacy also suggests that people are liable to be unfairly blamed when things go wrong. 
See Grint (2010) for a discussion of scapegoating of leaders, which is relevant to this point. 
The just world fallacy shows that attributions of qualities that may be deemed to warrant 
reward and punishment are often mistakenly based on lucky or unlucky outcomes, and 
therefore uneven distributions are liable to be the basis of such mistaken attributions. Unless 
we think it possible to eliminate fortune from the processes through which goods and harms 
are allocated, this ought to concern us. In the following section, I try to apply this lesson to 
contemporary organisations by offering some suggestions about the likely shape of Aristotelian 
community in business organisations. 
 
Egalitarian Aristotelian Organisations 
Koehn has criticised virtue ethics on the grounds that it “fails to acknowledge the possibility 
that generally accepted practices or procedures may themselves be suspect and that the agent 
may need to make a radical change in his or her thought in order to be able to do the right 
thing” (1998, p.510). This seems to be a well-founded misgiving, for the most part, though 
there are many varieties of virtue ethics which avoid this mistake. In this section, I draw on a 
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more radical strand in Aristotelianism, and use it to explore what organisations would need to 
be like in order to satisfy the criteria of an Aristotelian community. 
While Aristotle was aware that excessive inequality was liable to create an unhelpful 
factionalism which hindered politics (Pol 1304a), he is probably best characterised as a political 
conservative (Mulgan, 2000). Solomon’s own brand of Aristotelian business ethics is at the 
conservative end of the spectrum too. He suggests that “the virtues… do not involve radical 
demands on our behaviour” and that such a suggestion “is completely foreign to Aristotle’s 
insistence on “moderation”” (1993, p.203). We may wonder whether counselling moderation 
in a social milieu in which excess has become the norm, one in which pleonexia is often seen 
as a duty (MacIntyre, 2016, p.127), would count as a ‘radical demand’, but in any case, given 
the frequency of corporate scandals, we may be inclined to be somewhat more sceptical than 
Solomon about the ethical quality of contemporary business. That Solomon’s article ‘Business 
with Virtue? Maybe Next Year’ was published in 2000, the year before the WorldCom and 
Enron scandals, should serve as an ironic reminder that business ethicists have been prone to 
be more optimistic than the reality of ethics in business has warranted. Indeed, to counsel 
moderation where radical challenge is called for suggests they may even be prone to 
overestimate how just the world is.  
There is scope for a more egalitarian version of Aristotle’s community thesis which 
would be less threatened by the just world fallacy but would require us to radically change 
business organisations (a claim not unknown in the virtue ethics literature, see, for example, 
McPherson 2013). Solomon himself admits that as jobs become ever more insecure 
“contingency plans take the place of what once was called loyalty. Nothing is left to trust” 
(1994, p.273). The Aristotelian political community has the good of its citizens as its primary 
aim, but this is not and cannot be true for the contemporary firm, which must have profit as 
one of its central aims, if not its defining aim. As Morrell puts it, for Aristotle “the common 
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good rests ultimately on notions of justice in society rather than on profit in the firm” (2012, 
p.47). 
According to MacIntyre, perhaps the foremost ‘revolutionary’ virtue ethicist (see 
MacIntyre 2008), free market economies  
 
ruthlessly impose market conditions that forcibly deprive many workers of productive work, that 
condemn parts of the labor force in metropolitan countries and whole societies in less developed 
areas to irremediable economic deprivation, that enlarge inequalities and divisions of wealth and 
income, so organizing societies into competing and antagonistic interests (1998, p.249). 
 
Such a climate is hardly conducive to the emergence of Aristotelian communities. Indeed, this 
antagonism must be tackled in order to establish such communities. However, creating an 
organisation characterised by the relationships and participation required by Aristotelian 
communities is not easy to achieve.  
Relational equality is a distinctive feature of workplaces likely to give rise to genuine 
community, not a single policy that can be implemented. So, rather than offer a – for now 
perhaps – impossible imperative (‘ensure your organisation is egalitarian!’), we might, in a less 
utopian vein, offer simpler suggestions. To that end, I propose four related characteristics 
which might enable us to recognise organisations conducive to the emergence of genuine 
communities: a suspicion of inequality, minimal displays of unequal power, an emphasis on 
face-to-face interaction, and relatively equal pay. The first describes a complex habit of mind 
and character, and so is not to be regarded as a practical recommendation, per se, whereas the 
others may be actively pursued by organisations, even if they are perhaps better understood as 
signifiers of community. These are tentative suggestions based on my reading of the concept 
of Aristotelian community, and my intention here is to start a conversation on what the just 
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world fallacy entails for our social relationships within organisations and outside of 
experimental setting, rather than to offer the final word on the matter.3 
 
Suspicion of Inequality.  
Inequality of wealth and power may be understood in a variety of ways. It may be viewed as 
natural, or as warranted given the differences in merit between people, or it may be viewed as 
bizarre and at least prima facie requiring special justification. Those who start with the 
presumption that the world is unjust are likely to be relatively immune to the just world fallacy. 
Part of the appeal of a revolutionary Aristotelianism, i.e. one that takes Marxism and its key 
insights seriously, is that it enables us to understand the ‘re-enforcements’ which lead to unjust 
outcomes as being anything but random, but instead as being consequences of an unjust system. 
The re-enforcements are then regarded as being explicable, which lessens the psychological 
pressure to grope around for an explanation pertaining to individual merit or demerit. While 
the concept of ‘virtuous mean’ seems to be inherently moderate, sometimes the virtuous mean 
between extremes of excess and deficiency calls for radical action. Once upon a time, to believe 
in democracy was to be a revolutionary. 
Awareness of bias does not eliminate it. West et al (2012) found that cognitive 
sophistication does not prevent us from being blind to our own cognitive biases, and even being 
aware of such biases does not help us to avoid the classic reasoning errors documented in, for 
instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1975). However, I offer a tentative hypothesis: the more 
readily people identify cases of inequality as ‘extreme cases’, the less prone they will be to 
commit the just world fallacy. If we suspect the world to be unjust because of a presumption 
of the justice of equality, a presumption which can be intellectually motivated rather than 
merely intuitive, and therefore more readily identify inequality as being ‘extreme’, then 
committing the just world fallacy becomes less likely. If this is correct, then we would do well 
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to retain some of the suspicion Aristotle would have had about contemporary capitalism, even 
as we reject his own preference for inegalitarian politics. 
 
Few Displays of Unequal Power.  
Managers, directors, and other parties charged with designing organisational policy and 
governance measures, should make efforts to minimise displays of unequal power, wealth, or 
other rewards. The aim here would be to eliminate perceived distance between the most and 
least powerful within an organisation, to facilitate the discussion and shared deliberation 
required by communities. If inequalities in power or receipt of reward are not present, then it 
will not be possible for someone to commit the just world fallacy, which would facilitate the 
emergence of genuine community. Indeed, even where there are differences in power, which 
may be inevitable, a democratic spirit, in which power and authority are not appealed to, and 
are not actively on display, would be a way of fostering community. The suggestion offered 
here has some affinity with Landemore et al’s (2016) defence of workplace democracy and 
may find support from empirical studies which associate psychosocial wellbeing with the most 
democratic workplaces (see, for example, Knudsen et al, 2011). It also has an affinity with 
conceptions of management and leadership which focus on the needs of employees, rather than 
the characteristics of leaders and managers themselves, in particular Servant Leadership (see, 
for example, Greenleaf, 2002; Sinnicks, 2016). 
 
An Emphasis on Face-to-face Interaction.  
One notable feature of documented instances of experimental participants committing the just 
world fallacy is the relative paucity of information they have access to regarding the subjects 
they judge deserving of some good or ill. The studies focus on judgements pertaining to 
strangers where the only relevant information available is their receipt of some benefit or harm, 
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and it seems unlikely we would make such erroneous judgements about people we know well. 
Fostering close-knit working groups is likely to reduce the psychological pressure to commit 
the just world fallacy when confronted with unequal distributions of some good. Friendship, or 
some degree of warm association, is likely to prevent the self-evaluation of the less successful 
from ruling out participation in shared-deliberation. This contrasts with the impersonal nature 
of many large firms. Dobson claims that “the modern firm is simply creating different types of 
community: more fluid, more all-embracing, more virtual, and no less virtuous” (2008, p.73). 
On the topic of virtual communities, Dobson suggests that social networking internet sites are 
“all about building communities. Furthermore, these new communities are far more dynamic, 
all-embracing and geographically diverse” (ibid). However, someone might be able to identify 
a common good with the members of their department, that is, people with whom they have 
daily face-to-face contact, but it is harder to imagine this relationship obtaining between people 
whose only contact is via email, let alone people with whom they do not interact at all. 
Therefore, it is hard to believe that the geographical diversity or virtual interactions common 
within contemporary organisations will facilitate a genuinely Aristotelian community. These 
considerations may also be used to suggest that smaller organisations may be more likely to 
give rise to community, a point emphasised by MacIntyre (1999). This suspicion is also 
supported by research into optimal community size (see Dunbar & Sosis 2018), including the 
optimal size and structure of organisations (see Dunbar 2014), which recommend small 
groupings in which face-to-face interactions are common, and thus make closer personal 
relationships within the organisation more likely.  
 
Relatively Equal Pay.  
This may be a predictable item, but it is one to which my analysis of the just world fallacy, if 
correct, grants new argumentative impetus. Where goods are distributed reasonably equally, 
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there is no scope for people to commit the just world fallacy, resulting as it does from a 
psychological response to unevenly distributed rewards or harms. This is not a decisive 
argument for equality because other considerations may carry more weight, but it is not 
unimportant. Inequalities of income and wealth have increased over recent decades (Piketty, 
2014; Stiglitz, 2012), and there is evidence that this inequality is both harmful to the economy 
(Lansley, 2012) and generally corrodes trust in society (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). The just 
world fallacy simply adds weight to arguments against inequality when we can take it as a 
premise that the cultivation of community is a choice-worthy end. This is because, while 
relational and distributional equality are distinct concepts, the just world fallacy gives us reason 
– one reason among others – to think they are closely related. Therefore, one recommendation 
we might offer, though one which may require the powerful to perform virtuous actions 
unhappily, is to seek to create more distributively equal workplaces.  
Aristotelian business ethicists (such as Moore 2012b) may endorse Drucker’s claim that 
there should be some limit to the ratio between the pay of CEOs and average employee pay, 
Drucker’s own suggestions were in the 20:1 – 25:1 range (1977, 1984), even though they do 
not tend to be egalitarians about income and wealth. However, while the just world fallacy may 
suggest that inequalities in pay are justified if and only if they genuinely reflect differences in 
desert, even then they may undermine the sense of community within an organisation. This is 
because the predisposition to regard the rewarded as deserving their reward can foreclose the 
possibility of communal deliberation. It is worth noting that because the outcomes themselves 
are used as a heuristic for attributing merit or fault to others, even non-fortuitous rewards may 
be corrosive of community because derogation of those who deserve fewer rewards or to be 
harmed, for instance, may still blind us to the contribution they can make to a community. This 
point is exacerbated by the self-derogation that occurs when individuals have suffered some 
harm, as documented by Benson and Ritter’s (1990) research into unemployed subjects, 
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referenced above. As such, we can see just how difficult it is to foster just and genuine 
communities within business organisations. 
While more research may be needed if we are to ascertain precisely what levels of 
unequal reward may be detrimental to reasoned judgements about personal attributes, and by 
extension the relational equality required for community, the fortuitous reward in Lerner’s 
original 1965 study was US$3.50 for a 15-minute task (adjusted for inflation worth approx. 
US$27 today). This is a sign that even small differences in receipt of external goods, when it 
is the only thing we know about someone, can be extremely powerful. 
 
Conclusion 
When confronted with the question ‘does the modern large corporation fulfil the criteria of a 
community?’ the Aristotelian response is ‘it can and should’, but this prescription should be 
understood as being more radical than is typically the case. Indeed, if for Hartman it is possible 
but not probable for business organisations to be communities, our conclusion might be that it 
is conceivable but enormously difficult to achieve. The just world fallacy reveals that the 
mutual respect, care, and compassion which Solomon held to be definitive of corporations-as-
communities are harder to achieve than is typically assumed. While there is a definite 
conceptual distinction between the normative and descriptive senses of the community thesis, 
in reality there is less distance than this distinction might suggest. As MacIntyre (2007) has 
noted, all moralities presuppose a sociology: every ethical system presupposes some picture of 
social relations and its corollary social ontology. MacIntyre’s point may be read as a 
contemporary Aristotelian equivalent of the Kantian dictum ‘ought implies can’. With this in 
mind, I urge those who see value in shaping business organisations so that they approximate, 
as closely as is feasible, Aristotelian communities to consider the four characteristics I outline 
above – a suspicion of inequality, few displays of unequal power, an emphasis on face-to-face 
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interaction, and relatively equal pay – as possible tools for making such communities possible, 
and thus making the normative claim at the heart of the community thesis more than a merely 
abstract and aspirational imperative. 
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